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INTRODUCTION 
Adjudicative tribunals are given statutory authority to provide 
parties with remedies in order to fulfill statutory purposes.  How do we 
know, however, whether the remedies ordered by a tribunal actually do 
advance those purposes?  In other words, how can the success of an 
adjudicative tribunal be subject to meaningful empirical validation?  That 
is the question we explore in this brief study.  It is likely that this 
question, while broad in theory, can only be addressed by looking to the 
practice of a particular board or boards, in the context of a particular 
statute or statutes.  This study takes as its case study the role of 
adjudicative tribunals in the health system in Ontario. 
Adjudicative tribunals play an important role in the health sector, 
yet their actual influence as part of the health system remains largely 
unknown.1  Most evaluations of their work have focused on internal 
measures of accountability and independence rather than external 
indicators of societal impact.  When their effectiveness is examined, 
assessors tend to utilize anecdotes from various experts and stakeholders 
rather than the rigorous empirical data that is almost certainly better suited 
for the purpose.  As efforts to reform health systems continue 
internationally, it will be increasingly important to truly understand the 
benefits, costs and implications of adjudicative tribunals for providers and 
consumers of health care services as well as the institutional structures on 
                                                 
1  Adjudicative tribunals may be defined in a number of ways.  This category could 
include: (1) any administrative body engaged in adjudication, including regulatory 
bodies whose principle function is policymaking but who also engage in adjudication; 
(2) both administrative and judicial bodies which engage in adjudication; or (3) only 
those bodies whose primary or only function is adjudication.  We adopt the latter 
interpretation, but rely on studies and empirical approaches drawn from the regulatory 
and judicial environment as well, with necessary adaptation to the sphere of 
administrative bodies whose primary statutory function is adjudication.  Ron Ellis, for 
example, has identified 27 of such tribunals in the Province of Ontario in Canada 
which engage in “rights adjudication”: R. Ellis,  Executive Branch Justice: Canada’s 
‘Official Courts,’ (Ph.D. Dissertation. York University, 2009), at p. 77. 
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which they rely.  The dynamic, independent and powerful oversight 
mechanism of administrative bodies, and their dispute resolution 
potential, may only be realized with further information on the ways in 
which they interact with the rest of the complex health system and the 
impact they have within it.  A strong and accountable health system may 
depend upon it. 
In this context, empirical evaluations are an opportunity to inform 
health policymaking through the collection of objective data regarding the 
impact of adjudicative tribunals on the health system.  Empirical research 
includes quantitative and qualitative investigations on the effects of 
enacted or proposed interventions—including laws, regulations and 
policies—on economic, social or health outcomes.  It may be 
distinguished from other types of research by its reliance on data and its 
use of the scientific method of inquiry.2  Empirical study designs range 
from experimental (e.g., randomized controlled trials) to quasi-
experimental (e.g., interrupted time-series studies) to observational (e.g., 
cohort, case-control and cross-sectional studies), with data often gathered 
from surveys, interviews, focus groups, statistical inventories, 
performance data or documentary analyses. 
Empirical research, however, is not new to the health or legal 
spheres.  For health, experimentation, observation and the scientific 
method have all been at its core for over a hundred years, with modern 
“evidence-based medicine”3 even going as far as prioritizing the 
“conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best evidence in 
making decisions about the care of individual patients” over all other 
possible inputs.4  In the legal arena, empirical research has also started to 
expand both in general5 and for health-related studies specifically.6  
                                                 
2  M.M. Mello and K. Zeiler. “Empirical Health Law Scholarship: The State of the 
Field” (2008), 96 Georgetown Law Journal 649. 
3  Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, “Evidence-Based Medicine: A New 
Approach to Teaching the Practice of Medicine” (1992), 268 Journal of the American 
Medical Association 2420. 
4  D.L. Sackett, W.M Rosenberg, J.A. Gray, R.B. Haynes, and W.S. Richardson. 
“Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn’t” (1996), 312(7023) British 
Medical Journal 71, online: British Medical Journal <http://www.bmj.com/cgi/ 
content/full/312/7023/71> (accessed 8 January 2009). 
5  T.E. George, “An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship:  The Top Law 
Schools” (2006), 81(1) Indiana Law Journal 141, online: Indiana University Maurer 
School of Law, <http://www.law.indiana.edu/ilj/volumes/v81/no1/8_George.pdf> 
(accessed 15 January 2009). 
6  Supra note 2. 
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However, when compared to the health sphere, it is clear that empirical 
methodologies in studies of legal institutions have been relatively 
underutilized.  This can perhaps be explained by the complexity of legal 
interventions, the dearth of large-scale accessible data sets upon which to 
rely, and the heterogeneity of legal interventions which prevent natural 
experiments of cross-jurisdictional comparisons.7 
In addition to these general challenges faced by all empirical legal 
researchers, any attempt to evaluate the impact of a health-related 
adjudicative tribunal faces additional hurdles.  Not only has such an 
assessment never before been comprehensively undertaken, but the most 
suitable research methodology to do so remains highly elusive.  Much of 
empirical health research, for example, relates to patient outcomes and the 
costs associated with achieving these outcomes.  In the setting of 
adjudicative tribunals, these metrics may not apply.  A proceeding before 
a health tribunal may take place after the outcome for the patient already 
has occurred, and for this reason the tribunals in fact may impose 
additional costs on the health system without directly yielding improved 
health outcomes.  While those additional costs may well lead to better 
practices and procedures on the part of other actors in the health system 
(e.g., regulatory colleges, insurance plans, hospitals), this type of benefit 
is indirect, may only become apparent over time, and is inherently 
difficult to measure.    
Distinctions in statutory mandate and the absence of clear 
statutory language setting out the purposes of adjudicative tribunals leave 
no final target outcomes against which services can be evaluated.  Further, 
as creatures of statue that serve quasi-judicial functions, adjudicative 
tribunals sit at the intersection of the legal and health worlds.  These 
tribunals operate within these two paradigms—a dichotomy of process 
and outcomes—whose goals may sometimes diverge.   Indeed, these 
administrative bodies are expected to preserve the legal focus on process, 
fairness and individual-level dispute resolution while at the same time 
working to improve health-related outcomes by enhancing the overall 
effectiveness of the health system.8  The tension between a process- and a 
                                                 
7  Ibid. 
8  While this process-outcomes dichotomy between the legal and health worlds is 
certainly evident when comparing their respective research literature, it is important 
to recognize that both types of work are conducted within both realms.  Mello and 
Zeiler (2008), for example, highlight several socio-legal studies that gathered 
outcome-related data, and health researchers frequently address questions of ethics 
and resource allocation that are more procedural in nature. 
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substance-based mandate presents distinct challenges for empirical 
evaluation, especially as evaluations of either dimension would be 
difficult.  The complex co-dependence and interconnectedness of these 
tribunals with the health system’s constituent elements ensure that simple 
appraisal techniques cannot be effectively utilized.  To the extent that 
adjudicative tribunals have an impact on the health system, it is likely to 
be linked to a host of other variables.  The fact that evaluation is not easy, 
however, does not detract from its importance. 
The absence of any comprehensive empirical evaluations on the 
impact of adjudicative tribunals, and the potentially significant benefits of 
undertaking such an evaluation, certainly provide sufficient justification 
for further exploring this possibility.  Empirical research, for example, is 
the only way to accurately assess the population’s needs, capture 
stakeholders’ perceptions, test the effectiveness of new initiatives, and 
verify improvements over time.  It can help identify areas of strength and 
weakness, point to opportunities for growth or improvement, and facilitate 
a continual process of enhancements so as to better serve the tribunals’ 
constituents and strengthen the health system.   
Despite these benefits and recognized importance, the evaluation 
and accountability of adjudicative tribunals is also one of the least 
scrutinized areas of administrative law.  The topic necessarily engages the 
issue of administrative independence, the statutory environment within 
which all adjudicative tribunals operate, the policy priorities of 
government which funds tribunals, the complexity of the health system, 
and the role of the court in supervising health-related adjudicative 
tribunals through the mechanisms of judicial review.  Evaluating impact 
in the health sector is also necessarily a contextual exercise.   As Peter 
Cane observed in the administrative law context:  
[T]he impact of judicial review needs to be studied in a 
contextualised way by reference to judicial review’s objectives and 
functions.  Also, it should not be assumed that, when we discuss the 
impact of judicial review, we are all talking about impact of the 
same thing or, at least, of a single institution with a single set of 
objectives and functions.9   
                                                 
9  P. Cane, “Understanding Judicial Review and its Impact” in M. Hertogh and S. 
Halliday eds., Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact: International and 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
at pp. 15–42.  See also M. Sunkin, “Conceptual Issues in Researching the Impact of 
Judicial Review on Government Bureaucracies” in the same volume at pp. 43–75. 
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A similar approach is necessary for health-related adjudicative tribunals 
but has never been systematically followed. 
This paper aims to explore the context, challenges and 
opportunities for empirically evaluating the impact of adjudicative 
tribunals in the health sector.  First, we will discuss the purpose, function 
and importance of these bodies within the health system, including their 
statutory mandates and policy goals.  Second, we will examine the various 
ways in which their performance could potentially be assessed and will 
justify why there is a need to develop empirical approaches for the 
assessment of adjudicative decision-making.  Third, we will identify the 
extensive barriers to empirically evaluating the societal impact of 
adjudicative tribunals, which we situate in three distinct categories:  (1) 
complexity of the health system; (2) methodological complications; and 
(3) realities of the legal profession and the environment in which it 
currently operates.  Finally, based on this analysis, we will advance what 
we believe to be the most constructive path forward for the empirical 
assessment of adjudicative decision-making.  We hope that this work will 
encourage and inform future empirical evaluations of adjudicative 
tribunals in the health sector that will help to improve their performance, 
enhance health decision-making, advance patient safety goals and 
facilitate the achievement of population health goals. 
The focus of this analysis is on Ontario’s two adjudicative health 
tribunals in Canada, the Ontario Health Professions Appeals and Review 
Board (“HPARB”)10 and the Health Services Appeals and Review Board 
(“HSARB”).  Both HPARB and HSARB have statutory mandates to 
review important health decisions that intimately affect the lives of their 
constituents.  Using these two bodies as case studies for exploring the 
context, challenges and opportunities for evaluating adjudicative tribunals 
may enrich our understanding of administrative tribunals throughout other 
sectors as well.   
 
 
                                                 
10  Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, Recommendations to Health 
Professions Regulatory Advisory Council (Toronto: Health Professions Appeal and 
Review Board, 2008), online: Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, 
<http://www.hprac.org/en/projects/resources/hprac-1457May30HPARB.pdf> 
(accessed 28 March 2009). 
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I. THE CONTEXT OF ADJUDICATIVE TRIBUNALS IN THE HEALTH 
SECTOR 
Adjudicative tribunals are administrative bodies that are created 
by statutes and exercise delegated decision-making powers of the 
executive branch for the purposes of achieving certain policy goals.  They 
serve as an oversight mechanism for lower-level decision-makers and 
apply legal and normative principles to resolve disputes between 
conflicting parties.  They are independent—operating at arm’s-length 
from the government—and serve quasi-judicial functions otherwise 
fulfilled by the formal judicial system.  This independence, however, also 
has limits; their members are appointed by the executive branch of 
government (in the case of HPARB and HSARB, the power of 
appointment is effectively in the hands of the Minister of Health) which 
also sets their staffing allowances and budgets.  Their decisions, while 
often final, must be authorized by their enabling statute and are subject to 
judicial review by the courts.  Governments pursue policies in relation to 
these bodies for a host of reasons.  The government may, for example, 
wish to remove the need for court intervention, facilitate opportunities for 
settlement, enhance access to efficient and effective dispute resolution 
mechanisms, or promote fairness. 
In the health sector, adjudicative tribunals may be involved with 
resolving disputes regarding medical malpractice claims, insurance 
coverage for health care services, determination of mental capacity, 
licensing decisions for health care facilities, and patient safety procedures.  
They serve as an oversight and accountability mechanism for lower-level 
health decision-makers and ensure they follow appropriate processes and 
act according to their respective statutory mandates.  They aim to boost 
public confidence in the credibility of decision-making within the health 
system, facilitate better and more consistent decisions, and reduce the risk 
of errors that in this context can have deadly consequences.  Finally, they 
promote fairness and justice within health care, militate against self-
interest and corruption, and provide opportunities to address wrongs 
through redress. 
HPARB, for example, is an integral part of Ontario’s self-
regulating health professional system.  It helps to ensure that the health 
professions are regulated in the public interest, that appropriate standards 
of practice are created and maintained, that patients have access to the 
health professional of their choice, and that they are treated with respect 
and sensitivity by health professionals.  HPARB was established as a 
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response to two related phenomena in the early 1970s: first, the 
recommendation arising out of the Report by the Honourable James 
Chalmers McRuer’s Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights (the 
“McRuer Report”) which emphasized the need for public interest 
oversight over self-regulating professional bodies; and second, the 
Committee on the Healing Arts tabled by the government on April 28, 
1970 (the “Healing Arts Report”), which also emphasized the primacy of 
public interest regulation of health professionals.  Under the Province of 
Ontario’s Regulated Health Professions Act (“RHPA”), people may 
appeal the decision of a self-regulated health professional college to not 
pursue a disciplinary proceeding to HPARB.11  If the appropriate statutory 
processes were not followed by the relevant college, the Board is 
empowered to send the matter back to the college for reconsideration.  
HPARB also hears appeals from adverse decisions by the colleges in 
relation to registration requests.  The remedies available to HPARB 
panels focus on the regulated colleges, as opposed to the parties.  For 
example, if a complaint was dismissed and an HPARB panel finds that the 
investigation was inadequate or the decision to dismiss the complaint was 
unreasonable, the complaint usually will be sent back to the college to 
reconsider its reasons or investigate the complaint further.  
Recommendations to the college may also be provided where the issues 
raised on a complaint review are more systemic.  Parties, however, are not 
entitled to damages, or to an apology, or to any other individual remedy 
they may seek or to which they may feel entitled.  For this reason, it is not 
uncommon to find parties who both seek a complaint review from 
HPARB and simultaneously pursue civil remedies against health 
professionals or health facilities arising from the same factual 
circumstances. 
HSARB similarly is a part-time Board providing oversight for the 
decisions of various actors within the health system.  Its broad jurisdiction 
arises from fourteen different statutes and includes reviewing decisions 
concerning payment for health care services under the Ontario Health 
Insurance Plan (“OHIP”), eligibility for housing in long-term care 
facilities, licensing of nursing homes and other independent health 
                                                 
11  Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 18, s. 3.  Also see R. 
Steinecke, A Complete Guide to the Regulated Health Professions Act.  (Toronto: 
Canada Law Book, Looseleaf).  The RHPA is one of several statutes administered by 
HPARB. 
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facilities, and the decisions of public health officials.12  By contrast, 
HSARB provides individual remedies, ordering, for example, that OHIP 
fund out-of-country medical services where the statutory test is met. 
Both HPARB and HSARB have a full-time Chair,13 and a roster of 
part-time members, some of whom have legal training (and, in the case of 
HSARB, medical training) and some who do not.  Both Boards have been 
held to be expert bodies by reviewing Courts which warrant deference.  
Their substantive decisions may only be overturned if found to be 
“unreasonable.”14 
As indicated above, a key aspect of evaluating tribunals created by 
statute is to assess whether a tribunal is fulfilling its statutory objective(s).  
This may be especially challenging, for example, if the specific goals of 
the relevant tribunal are diffuse and ambiguous in their enabling 
legislation.  Ontario’s RHPA, for example, does not detail the purposes of 
the Board, so this must be inferred from the powers and authority with 
which it has been provided.  For example, as indicated above, HPARB 
has the power to review decisions of regulated health colleges not to refer 
complaints to a full hearing to determine if a health professional has 
engaged in misconduct warranting discipline on grounds of the 
reasonableness of the college’s decision and the adequacy of the college’s 
investigation.15  HPARB has broader jurisdiction to review decisions by 
colleges to deny registration to applicants.16  Thus, while HPARB’s role is 
generally to ensure public interest accountability over decision-making by 
regulated health colleges, HPARB’s role in reviewing complaints 
suggests a different purpose, and a more deferential standard of review, 
than its role in reviewing denials of registration.  Evaluation needs to be 
responsive to these differences of statutory mandate and remedial 
discretion. 
 
                                                 
12  C. Pitfield and C.M. Flood, “Section 7 ‘Safety Valves’: Appealing Wait Times Within 
a One-Tier System” in C.M. Flood, K. Roach and L.Sossin eds., Access to Care, 
Access to Justice: The Legal Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada, 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), at pp. 477–501. 
13  Since 2008, the same individual has served as Chair of both Boards. 
14  See, with respect to HPARB, Botros v. Beadle (2007), 228 O.A.C. 75, and with 
respect to HSARB, Flora v. Ontario (Health Insurance Plan, General Manager) 
(2008), 91 O.R. (3d) 412. 
15  See s. 29(2) of the Health Professions Procedure Code, Schedule 2 to the RHPA. 
16  See s. 22(1) of the Health Professions Procedure Code, Schedule 2 to the RHPA. 
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II. THE CONTEXT FOR EVALUATING ADJUDICATIVE TRIBUNALS 
Assessing the work of these adjudicative tribunals and others in 
the health sector is an inherently complex enterprise.  However, 
evaluations can be thought of and categorized according to their 
orientation and methodology. 
In terms of orientation, evaluations of tribunals can be focused on 
how they function or what impact they have.  The former would analyze 
the internal operations of a tribunal while the latter would assess the 
body’s external effects on a specified population.  Procedural analyses are 
important to promote coherent internal management structures, good 
governance, accountability, efficiency and efficacy.  External impact 
evaluations, on the other hand, represent a way to assess the real-world 
effectiveness of the adjudicative tribunal, its impact on others within the 
health care system, and the benefits (or consequences) that this impact 
yields.  Such studies can determine whether or not these bodies support 
and/or enhance the functioning of various health system institutions and 
decision-makers and whether or not they ultimately influence service 
provision, access to justice in the health sector, and health outcomes.  
External impact evaluations require expertise and independence—they are 
not traditionally conducted by auditors,17 ombudsmen18 or internal staff.19 
A review of several purposively sampled governmental 
evaluations of administrative bodies highlights very clearly that they tend 
to focus on issues related to internal operations rather than external 
impact.  The recent report of the Ontario Security Commission’s Fairness 
Committee, for example, examined whether the agency’s internal 
governance structure created a perception or reality of bias in its 
adjudicative responsibilities.20  The United Kingdom’s National Audit 
                                                 
17  J. McCarter, Annual Report 2008: Office of the Auditor-General, (Toronto: Queen’s 
Printer for Ontario, 2008), online: Office of the Auditor General 
<http://www.auditor.on.ca/en/reports_en/en08/ar_en08.pdf> (accessed 22 June 2009). 
18  A. Marin, Ombudsman Ontario: Annual Report 2007–2008, (Toronto: Office of the 
Ombudsman, 2008), online: Office of the Ombudsman, <http://www.ombudsman. 
on.ca/media/18971/ar08_eng.pdf> (accessed 22 June 2009). 
19  Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council, HPRAC: Annual Report April 1, 
2007 – March 31, 2008, (Toronto: Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council, 
2008), online: Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council http://www. 
hprac.org/en/reports/resources/HPRACAnnualReport2007-2008.pdf.  
20  C.A. Osborne, D.J. Mullan and B. Finlay, Report of the Fairness Committee to David 
A. Brown, Q.C., Chair of the Ontario Securities Commission, (Toronto: Ontario 
Securities Commission, 2004). 
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Office similarly reviewed the procedures used by its Department of Work 
and Pensions to medically assess incapacity and disability21 and to hear 
appeals of social security benefit decisions.22  Some reviews examine 
particular problems that had previously been identified23 while others 
focus on users’ satisfaction with a tribunal’s provision of services.24  
Several assessment efforts have even focused on the internal operations of 
multiple tribunals or a jurisdiction’s entire tribunal system, including the 
report of Ontario’s Agency Reform Commission,25 the UK’s Leggatt 
                                                 
21  National Audit Office, Progress in Improving the Medical Assessment of Incapacity 
and Disability Benefits: Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General. HC 1141, 
Session 2002-2003, 17/10/2003, (London: Stationery Office, 2003), online: National 
Audit Office <http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/02-03/02031141.pdf> 
(accessed 12 March 2009). 
22  National Audit Office, Getting It Right, Putting It Right: Improving Decision-Making 
and Appeals in Social Security Benefits. HC 1142, Session 2002-2003, 07/11/2003, 
(London: Stationery Office, 2003), online: National Audit Office <http://www.nao. 
org.uk/publications/nao_reports/02-03/02031142.pdf> (accessed 12 March 2009). 
23  See, for example, Society of Ontario Adjudicators and Regulators, Towards 
Maintaining and Improving the Quality of Adjudication: SOAR Recommendations for 
Performance Management in Ontario’s Administrative Justice Tribunals, (Toronto: 
Society of Ontario Adjudicators and Regulators, 1995), online: Society of Ontario 
Adjudicators and Regulators <http://www.soar.on.ca/soar-perf_man.htm> (accessed 
12 March 2009); S. Blumenthal and S. Wessely. The Pattern of Delays in Mental 
Health Review Tribunals, (London: Stationery Office, 1993); S. Blumenthal and S. 
Wessely. “The Pattern of Delays in Mental Health Review Tribunals” (1994), 18(7) 
Psychiatric Bulletin 398, online: Psychiatric Bulletin <http://pb.rcpsych.org/cgi/ 
reprint/18/7/398.pdf> (accessed 12 March 2009). 
24  See, for example J. Aston, D. Hill and N.D. Tackey, The Experience of Claimants in 
Race Discrimination Employment Tribunal Cases.  Employment Relations Research 
Series, No. 55, (London: UK Department of Trade and Industry, 2006), online: UK 
Department of Trade and Industry <http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file27818.pdf> 
(accessed 12 March 2009); Employment Tribunals Service, Employment Tribunals 
Service User Survey 2005,  (London:  Employment Tribunals Service, 2005); 
Confederation of British Industry, A Matter of Confidence: Restoring Faith in 
Employment Tribunals, (London: Confederation of British Industry, 2005), online: 
Confederation of British Industry <http://www.cbi.org.uk/ndbs/Press.nsf/0/ 
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Review of Tribunals,26 and the report of the UK’s former Council on 
Tribunals.27  Academic publications similarly appear to focus on the 
internal operations of tribunals across various topics—whether they 
regulate securities,28 medical malpractice claims,29 privacy,30 pensions,31 
or determinations of medical incapacity—32 and often examine users’ 
experience.33  While not a single governmental evaluation could be found 
                                                 
26  A. Leggatt, Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service, (London: UK Department 
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27  M. Adler and J. Gulland, Tribunal Users’ Experiences, Perceptions and Expectations: 
A Literature Review, (London: Council on Tribunals, 2003), online: Council on 
Tribunals <http://www.council-on-tribunals.gov.uk/docs/other_adler(2).pdf> 
(accessed 2 February 2009). 
28  S. Rousseau, The Québec Experience with an Independent Administrative Tribunal 
Specialized in Securities: A Study of the Bureau de décision et de révision en valeurs 
mobilières, (Ottawa: Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, 2008), online: Groupe 
d’experts sur la réglementation des valeurs mobilières <http://www.groupeexperts.ca/ 
eng/reports/research-studies/quebec-independent-adjudicative-tribunal-rousseau.php> 
(accessed 12 March 2009); P. Moyer, “The Regulation of Corporate Law by 
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University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 43. 
29  G. Siegal, M.M. Mello and D.M. Studdert, “Adjudicating Severe Birth Injury Claims 
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Compensation” (2008), 34 American Journal of Law and Medicine 489, online: 
Harvard School of Public Health <http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/faculty/michelle-
mello/files/FL-VA_PDF.pdf> (accessed 2 February 2009). 
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pdf> (accessed 29 November 2008). 
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summaries/8Sossin.html> (accessed 29 November 2008). 
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(accessed 12 March 2009); J. Peay, Tribunals on Trial: A Study of Decision Making 
Under the Mental Health Act 1983.  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). 
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that focused on the external impact of adjudicative tribunals, at least one 
academic publication discusses the potential benefits that administrative 
“health courts” (which resolve malpractice claims) can have on patient 
safety.34  
In terms of methodology, assessments of tribunals can either be 
conducted through expert reviews or empirical evaluations.  The first 
approach would take advantage of the personal experiences and 
perspective of an investigator, while the second approach harnesses the 
objectivity of the scientific method and the generalizability of data that 
was collected from many people.  Expert reviews rely upon the contextual 
and reflective expertise of the authors and are important for probing the 
etiology of complex challenges within the tribunal system, raising 
questions of possible concern or future inquiry, indentifying structural 
problems and possible ways to overcome them, justifying political 
decisions (either from the past or those planned for the future), and 
suggesting palatable recommendations for reform.  This approach is also 
more likely to have fewer costs and a faster completion timeline.   
Empirical evaluations of tribunals, by contrast, utilize scientific methods 
and can be used to, inter alia, quantitatively or qualitatively assess their 
impact on the health system, identify the factors that determine their 
successful operations, and track perceptions of them over time.  It is 
important to note, however, that these two methodological approaches 
cannot in reality be strictly dichotomized, as experts often utilize 
empirical methods and even the most scientifically rigorous and objective 
evaluations must be interpreted by individuals—who are preferably 
experts in their field.   
Reviews of adjudicative tribunals have been conducted using both 
expert and empirical methodologies.  Prominent observers, academics and 
practitioners, for example, have assessed various tribunals’ organizational 
structures,35 efficiency,36 accessibility,37 independence,38 performance 
standards39 and overall effectiveness.40  Other reviews feature  empirical 
                                                 
34  M.M. Mello, D.M. Studdert, A. Kachalia and T.A. Brennan, “‘Health Courts’ and 
Accountability for Patient Safety” (2006), 84 Milbank Quarterly 459. 
35  Supra note 21. 
36  Supra note 30. 
37  Supra note 33. 
38  Supra note 34. 
39  Supra note 24. 
40  Supra notes 32, 31, 38; infra note 43. 
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elements such as: (1) surveys that capture the perceived quality of 
services offered,41 stakeholder attitudes towards the tribunal,42 and the 
functioning of a certain process;43 (2) interviews that probe users’ 
experiences with the tribunal,44 its perceived impartiality,45 and the 
effectiveness of a particular procedure;46 and (3) performance data and 
documentary analyses for examining key features of a tribunal’s 
caseload47 and arrangements for how it makes appeal decisions.48  
The challenge in evaluating health-related adjudicative tribunals, 
therefore, seems to lie at the intersection of orientation and methodology. 
Assessments of adjudicative tribunals have focused on both process and 
impact, and have been conducted using both expert reviews and empirical 
methods, yet not a single review could be found that empirically 
evaluated the external impact of an adjudicative tribunal, despite 
extensive searching.  While this lack of research may indicate that such 
undertakings are not important, interesting or possible, the evidence 
suggests otherwise: the need for external impact evaluations is evident49 
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and such evaluations have been conducted with success in related settings 
that also involve the nexus of the health and law sectors and beyond.50 
The dearth of externally-focused empirical evaluations is not only 
a missed opportunity; it may also pose a significant risk.  The lack of an 
empirical rationale for the benefits of a tribunal may render it vulnerable 
to opposition or simply to general cost-cutting initiatives.   Without this 
data, the Boards may lack the baseline measures needed to track changes 
over time, evaluate the performance of decision-makers and staff, and 
engage in longer-term strategic planning.  In short, without empirical 
knowledge, how can we be sure that adjudicative tribunals are serving the 
public interest? 
Indeed, it is widely accepted that data-driven strategies are more 
likely to help decision-makers achieve their goals in a cost-effective way 
than polices pursued in the absence of evidence.51  Information gathered 
by health-related adjudicative tribunals like HPARB and HSARB through 
empirical methods may be of particular interest to government officials as 
it can demonstrate performance benchmarks and ensure public funds are 
being invested and spent effectively.  If reform is called for, empirical 
data will be essential in identifying what needs to change.  For academics, 
it is an under-scrutinized sphere of administrative law and health systems 
functioning that is both ripe for research and, potentially, reform. 
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III. CHALLENGES FOR EMPIRICALLY EVALUATING ADJUDICATIVE 
TRIBUNALS 
Yet despite the tremendous benefits, empirical impact evaluations 
of adjudicative tribunals are not being conducted.  This absence of 
assessment efforts is most likely attributable to the various challenges 
facing anyone who embarks on undertaking such a project.  In the context 
of health adjudicative tribunals, these obstacles can be divided into three 
categories: (1) complexity in the health system; (2) methodological 
complications; and (3) legal factors. 
 
A. CHALLENGES WITH COMPLEXITY IN THE HEALTH SYSTEM 
Empirically evaluating the impact of any adjudicative tribunal is a 
naturally difficult enterprise, as it requires the body’s various effects to be 
isolated from the larger social context within which it operates.  This is no 
doubt complicated for tribunals in every sector because their activities are 
usually only indirectly related to their existential goals.  This challenge, 
however, may be further exacerbated in the health context due to its 
overwhelming complexity. 
Indeed, health systems are increasingly being recognized as 
complex adaptive systems that are multi-layered, non-linear and highly 
sophisticated.  They consist of countless sub-systems with immeasurable 
independent actors, established policies, zealously guarded interests, 
entrenched professional “silos” and divergent cultures that can all 
influence each another and even alter their external environments.  This 
web of elements, and the unpredictable interactions among them, ensures 
that conventional mechanistic or “cause-effect” conceptualizations of the 
health system are inaccurate and oversimplifications of its complex 
dynamics.52 
While scientific knowledge has been greatly advanced by breaking 
big questions into smaller ones that can be observed, analyzed and 
understood through rational deduction, this process is severely limited 
when the studied phenomenon or intervention is located within a system 
whose constitutive parts are not independent, constant or predictable.  The 
fact that the health system exhibits characteristics of distributed control, 
co-dependence and nesting of smaller systems within other larger systems 
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further aggravates this challenge and makes it difficult to fully examine 
adjudicative tribunals without reference to other actors and institutions 
(such as adjudicators, staff, government policymakers, regulatory 
colleges, relevant expert panels, the traditional court system and the 
public).  Isolating and attributing impact is further problematized by the 
fact that health-related adjudicative tribunals serve diverse functions 
according to various players within completely different contexts.53 
 
B. CHALLENGES WITH RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Yet in addition to the daunting barriers imposed by health system 
complexity, there are further methodological barriers associated with such 
an undertaking.  The primary challenge, as highlighted above, is that 
simple research designs cannot be used to isolate adjudicative tribunals 
and elegantly locate cause-effect relationships between them and their 
goals.  But above and beyond the various explanations illuminated by the 
complexity perspective is the fact that efforts of adjudicative tribunals are 
only indirectly related to their goals.  Indeed, health services themselves 
only partially help meet their goal of improved health for people.  Any 
legal, regulatory or oversight “intervention” that serves to better structure 
these services would be even further removed from their ultimate goals.  
Empirical impact studies of such interventions must be expertly designed 
to account for this complexity. 
However, even if simple methods did exist to observe the 
relationship between adjudicative tribunals and their goals, there is 
currently a lack of clear evaluative criteria against which particular 
adjudicative tribunals can be measured.  This is because their goals are 
not easily articulated and have thus not been defined with adequate 
precision—if defined at all.  Desired outcome measures are consequently 
absent, which ensures that suitable quantitative and/or qualitative research 
methodologies cannot be matched to them.  This problem, however, 
cannot simply be overcome by brainstorming possible goals of 
adjudicative tribunals.  Indeed, the existential purpose of these bodies 
may change and evolve over time with new legislators, government 
policymakers, adjudicators and tribunal staff who can each contribute 
toward a shift in the focus and priority of their operations over time. 
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Various community stakeholders may also perceive the role of a 
particular adjudicative tribunal in their sector very differently depending 
upon their own mandate, ideological perspective and unique vantage 
point.  While reference to a tribunal’s enabling statute may be informative 
in crafting an outcome measure, it is not always decisive.  In the case of 
HPARB, legislative provisions suggest this body was created to ensure 
effective regulation of the health professions in the public interest,54 yet 
this goal is not easily quantifiable.  Indeed, the ability to empirically 
evaluate a complex intervention like a health-related adjudicative tribunal 
depends upon having a desired outcome that is observable, measurable 
and testable against a null hypothesis. 
A desire to empirically “prove” cause-effect relationships between 
adjudicative tribunals and a particular outcome is also complicated by the 
impossibility of randomly allocating potential users of existing tribunals 
into groups that either receive or do not receive their services.  
Randomized controlled trials—the most rigorous of discrete empirical 
evaluations—55 assess the effect of an intervention on a test population in 
comparison to a theoretically identical population.  This method, 
however, requires a properly-constituted (i.e., randomized) and 
adequately-sized (i.e., large) control group with both known and unknown 
confounding factors evenly distributed between them in order to isolate 
the impact of tribunal services and measure it against a benchmark.  Non-
randomized retrospective evaluations comparing users of tribunals to non-
users (or the situation of the general public in jurisdictions with and 
without comparable tribunals) may not be an ideal solution to this 
challenge, as this creates a situation where user-status and outcomes are 
measured at the same time.  This prevents efforts to control for 
confounding factors, which in turn extinguishes the possibility of making 
causal determinations.56 
A penultimate methodological challenge for conducting external 
impact evaluations of health-related adjudicative tribunals is that there are 
few examples of past efforts to emulate.  As previously mentioned, many 
empirical studies have examined the internal processes of tribunals, but 
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none could be found that focused on their societal impact.  This is 
exacerbated by the dearth of obvious empirical data sets which can be 
analyzed and from which potential evaluators can draw.57  Whereas 
hospitals may be able to compare their patient population and its 
outcomes to those from neighbouring hospitals, adjudicative tribunals are 
not likely in a position to continually collect data about their past users 
nor compare this information to existing data sets from the same region or 
others. 
Finally, the identity and background of the researcher(s) 
evaluating the impact of an adjudicative tribunal must also be considered.  
While the goal of empirical study is to avoid bias and ideological 
assumptions, every researcher brings a particular matrix of perspective, 
orientation, experience and values to their work.  Insiders, for example, 
may bring intuition and experiential judgment, while outsiders may bring 
independence, fresh eyes and objectivity.   
 
C. LEGAL FACTORS 
As institutions that function within both the health and legal 
systems, health-related adjudicative tribunals must also overcome the 
realities of the legal sector that may not be particularly nurturing for 
empirical impact evaluations.  For example, legal actors are often focused 
more on achieving due process, transparency and good governance than 
specific societal outcomes (like improved health status which is the goal 
of direct clinical health care).  Excellent process in the legal world is often 
thought to be the most likely way to achieve the best outcome. 
There is also a much greater concern for maintaining 
independence and avoiding any apprehension of bias.  Like impartiality, 
independence is a common law right of procedural fairness enjoyed by 
parties who come before administrative bodies in common law 
jurisdictions (including Canada, United States, United Kingdom, 
Australia and New Zealand).  In Canada, independence for adjudicative 
tribunals is based on the categories of judicial independence identified by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Valente v. The Queen (i.e., security of 
tenure, financial independence and administrative independence over 
adjudicative matters)58 and applied to administrative bodies in Canadian 
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Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band—albeit in a more flexible and 
contextually sensitive manner.59 
Respecting this independence of adjudicative tribunals will 
naturally influence the process and content of any evaluation in multiple 
ways.  For example, independence suggests that governments should 
refrain from evaluating tribunals’ substantive decisions lest reasonable 
observers reach the legally-problematic conclusion that tribunals may 
adjust their decision-making to align with what the government of the day 
perceives as “successful.”  Similarly, it may also be difficult for a tribunal 
to establish evaluative criteria or outcome measures for itself, as this 
might lead a reasonable observer to conclude that the tribunal may pursue 
these goals at the expense of fairness to the parties.  This concern for 
independence even questions the extent to which tribunals’ staff and 
members can be directly involved in any evaluation for fear of influencing 
or interfering with their services, which must remain neutral at all times.  
Contrary to encouraging self-evaluation as is common within the health 
sphere, the legal environment may actually discourage adjudicative 
tribunals from assessing their own external impact, especially since such 
undertakings are not explicitly part of their statutory mandates.60 
Finally, as recently highlighted by the Nuffield Inquiry on 
Empirical Legal Research, the legal academy also suffers from a dearth of 
empirical competence and capacity to conduct such studies.61  While the 
field of empirical health law scholarship has recently grown 
exponentially,62 it is generally accepted that current capacity is inadequate 
and that it may further diminish over time.  Empirical legal methodologies 
are also generally recognized as under-developed relative to doctrinal and 
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theoretical methodologies.63  The pervasive culture of deference to 
experts and authority must further diminish the perceived value of 
objective empirical work and weaken any apparent need for more 
rigorous research that is higher on the hierarchy of evidence.64  Again, the 
focus on elements of process (e.g., bias and independence) rather than 
impact (e.g., judicial decisions) as indicator of quality and performance 
must also deter legal scholars from conducting work in this area such that 
target outcomes are less likely to be assessed. 
 
IV. REASONS FOR OPTIMISM 
However, despite the challenges faced by potential evaluators of 
adjudicative tribunals, there is reason for optimism:  each of the various 
identified barriers can be overcome and have indeed been circumvented in 
similar evaluations.  For example, as previously mentioned, many 
empirical evaluations have been conducted that focus on the internal 
operations of these bodies.  A major literature review in 2007 highlighted 
much of the work that has been conducted and published in this area.65  
Yet in addition to these studies, empirical evaluations have also been 
undertaken to assess the external impact of similarly-functioning specialty 
courts that operate within the judicial system.  A systematic review of the 
research evidence has even been conducted on the societal impact of at 
least one type of these judicial organs.66 
Indeed, methodologically, there may be much to learn from 
external impact evaluations of specialist courts in the judicial sector.  For 
example, “drug courts” have been extensively evaluated in the United 
States and in other jurisdictions regarding their ability to increase 
treatment rates, lower criminal recidivism, and enhance cost-effectiveness 
of prosecution.67  Domestic violence courts and community courts have 
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similarly been assessed for compliance, cost-effectiveness, conviction 
rates and public perception, and mental health courts have been 
comprehensively examined for reducing criminal violence, enhancing 
community safety, conserving fiscal resources and improving clinical 
outcomes.  However, it must be recognized that the context within which 
these judicial bodies operate is very different from that of health-related 
administrative tribunals.  Not only are they part of the judiciary rather 
than the executive branch of government, but their existential goals are 
usually related to diverting complex or special cases from traditional 
courtrooms rather than supporting the infrastructure of a completely 
different system (like that of health).  Empirically tracking desired 
outcomes like cost-savings and reduced reoffending rates will naturally be 
easier in this context when the intervention or service is more directly 
related to its goal.  Yet, alternatively, it may actually be more difficult for 
these judicial organs to evaluate themselves due to their strict separation 
from the executive (which has the financial resources to fund such an 
undertaking) and the likelihood that they will zealously guard their 
independence.   
The possible range of empirical legal research methodologies that 
can be used in evaluating health-related adjudicative tribunals may benefit 
from earlier studies.  For example, Mello and Zeiler describe the diversity 
and comparative advantages of various empirical approaches that have 
been taken by scholars in the health law field to address issues as wide-
ranging as medical malpractice reform and motor safety laws.68  And on 
the use of randomized controlled trials, for which these two scholars are 
less optimistic, Pleasence provides an account of such an undertaking in 
the United Kingdom, highlights the many technical, practical and ethical 
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barriers that were faced, and suggests ways to overcome them in the 
future.69 
 
V. OPPORTUNITIES FOR MOVING FORWARD 
Deliberate and concerted efforts, however, will be necessary—
among both individual evaluators and others that must support them—to 
overcome the numerous barriers to empirical impact evaluations of 
health-related adjudicative tribunals.  The analysis of challenges described 
above point to several strategies that can be pursued. 
At the individual level, potential evaluators of adjudicative 
tribunals may need to assemble interdisciplinary teams to obtain the 
necessary methodological expertise, bring an aura of independence and 
credibility to the work, and save tribunal staff from the potentially 
uncomfortable situation of relinquishing their perceived independence by 
evaluating their own performance.  Like the process for assessing the 
effectiveness of complex clinical interventions, evaluators of adjudicative 
tribunals may then be advised to conceptually map out the way in which 
their tribunal functions, its interactions and relationships with others in the 
health and legal systems, and its potential effects on each of them.70  This 
will aid in focusing the inquiry, identifying areas in which little is known, 
generating suitable research questions and determining the appropriate 
methodology. 
Potential evaluators must also thoughtfully consider both the 
target audience of their research and the overall goal that their particular 
health-related adjudicative tribunal is expected to help achieve, and then 
identify the most important targeted outcomes that are relevant to the 
audience and important for the goal’s fulfillment.  When such outcomes 
cannot directly be measured, as may often be the case, evaluators must 
identify strong surrogate endpoints which are measurements that reflect 
important outcomes even if they are of indirect or diminished practical 
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importance.  Performance indicators can then be developed followed by 
the corresponding methodologies for tracking changes to them. 
In the case of Ontario’s health-related adjudicative tribunals, both 
HPARB and HSARB may describe their overall goal as contributing to 
the health of Ontarians by enhancing decision-making within the health 
system.  If government officials are the evaluation’s intended audience, 
targeted outcomes could include: (1) confidence in the health system; (2) 
equity, justice and fairness in health decision-making; (3) strengthened 
health system institutions; and (4) better health services and patient safety 
via enhanced regulation and oversight.  Since these outcomes would be 
nearly impossible to measure directly, surrogate endpoints can be 
developed and could possibly include: (1a) access to adjudicative 
mechanisms for dispute resolution; (1b) perceived legitimacy of 
adjudicative decisions; (2a) satisfaction with adjudicative services; (2b) 
perceived fairness and legitimacy of adjudicative services; (3a) interaction 
with health system institutions and decision-makers; (3b) existence of 
support mechanisms for primary health decision-makers; (3c) effective 
oversight of primary health decision-makers; (4a) better decisions by 
primary health decision-makers; and (4b) respect for the tribunal’s 
oversight function.  Performance indicators and their corresponding 
empirical methodologies could then range from the public’s awareness for 
the tribunal’s existence to the perceived concern among primary health 
decision-makers that their decisions will be reversed.   
Once a system of empirical observation is in place, potential 
evaluators can establish benchmarks according to which they can track 
and assess performance.  Such comparative points of measurement can be 
drawn from thoughtful consideration, aspirational goals of leaders, expert 
judgments on what is possible, data from similar tribunals in other 
jurisdictions (i.e., comparative analysis), or previous empirical 
observations from the same tribunal (i.e., interrupted time-series analysis).  
For experimental methods like randomized, controlled trials that are rarer 
in socio-legal studies, the control group would serve as the comparative 
benchmark rather than any observational data that is external to the 
evaluation.  Such comparisons are naturally better because they more 
accurately represent the counterfactual of what the situation would be like 
without the tribunal and can help lead to determinations of causation. 
But overcoming the identified challenges and systematizing 
empirical impact evaluations of health-related adjudicative tribunals 
across time and jurisdictions requires action from stakeholders throughout 
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the health and legal systems.  For example, scholars in the health law field 
must intensify their efforts to build capacity for utilizing empirical 
methodologies, enhance the status of such work within legal circles, and 
overcome any real or perceived problems with maintaining independence.  
Health system institutions should also start to build policy-relevant 
databases that are rigorously compiled, comprehensive and publicly-
accessible.  Finally, health planners and research funders must facilitate 
(or even catalyze) the continuous improvement of adjudicative tribunals 
by supporting undertakings to empirically evaluate their impact on 
society.  Initial funding for small-scale evaluations and/or pilot projects 
would be particularly helpful, as would support for disseminating any 
lessons learned as widely as possible. 
Syntheses of research evidence may be helpful in encouraging 
stakeholders to support empirical impact evaluations of health-related 
adjudicative tribunals, especially because they are likely to highlight the 
current dearth of knowledge in this area.  A systematic review on the 
effect of adjudicative tribunals in the health sector, for example, would be 
a disciplined and rigorous approach to assessing the current state of 
research evidence in this area and tracking developments in it over time.71  
This tool applies the scientific method to gathering, appraising and 
synthesizing what is known (and what is not known) on a particular topic 
such that publication and selection bias are limited.72  Such a review has 
already been conducted, for example, to assess the impact of drug courts 
on criminal recidivism,73 and a protocol has been developed to evaluate 
the influence of these specialist courts on narcotics use in particular and 
criminal activity more broadly.  
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CONCLUSION 
In summary, adjudicative tribunals serve an essential function 
within the health sector, yet their contributions and impact on the delivery 
of health services and society in general are not usually evaluated 
empirically.  The focus of past tribunal assessments on their internal 
operations limit these bodies’ ability to inform continuous quality 
improvement efforts, enhance the public’s confidence in them and 
maximize their societal impact.  Three challenges, however, serve to 
complicate empirical impact evaluations of health-related adjudicative 
tribunals.  First, the complexity of the health system and its countless 
independent actors prevents their mechanistic isolation, which is 
necessary to elegantly find cause-effect relationships between them and 
their goals.  Second, the indirect relationship between tribunal services 
and their existential purposes—exacerbated by uncertain objectives, 
difficulties with randomization and a lack of examples to follow—
presents methodological barriers that cannot be easily overcome.  Third, 
several realities of the legal profession and the environment in which it 
currently operates further hinder evaluation efforts, including its dearth of 
empirical capacity, culture of deference to authority, and focus on process 
and independence. 
There are, however, two main reasons for optimism.  Empirical 
evaluations of similar judicial bodies have been previously conducted and 
there is currently a rapid expansion of interest in empirical health law 
scholarship.  This analysis of challenges to empirically evaluating the 
impact of adjudicative tribunals in the health sector highlights several 
potential ways to help move this agenda forward.  Individual evaluators, 
for example, can assemble interdisciplinary teams, identify their tribunal’s 
overall goal, develop surrogate endpoints and conduct a realistic 
evaluation that tracks each of them.  Stakeholders within the health and 
legal systems, on the other hand, can support individual efforts by 
earmarking funds for such empirical impact evaluations, building policy-
relevant databases and assisting with cross-jurisdictional learning and 
dissemination efforts.  Syntheses of the research evidence on this topic, 
and systematic reviews in particular, may be helpful for highlighting the 
absence of knowledge in this area and building support to capitalize on 
this otherwise missed opportunity. 
Nevertheless, a foundational question remains as to whether it is 
even the responsibility of adjudicative tribunals like Ontario’s HPARB 
and HSARB to be empirically evaluating their own impact or to help 
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others in doing so.  Besides the limitations imposed upon them by their 
respective statutory mandates, these bodies and others may not 
necessarily be concerned about the impact of their decisions and could in 
fact be preoccupied with maintaining their independence.  Further 
consideration must be given to these issues, and others, so that continuous 
quality improvement and self-evaluation can become part of tribunals’ 
core mandates, as otherwise it will be impossible for these bodies to 
provide the best services possible to their users, stakeholders and larger 
constituency.  Any ambitions for self-improvement among health-related 
adjudicative tribunals, however, must obviously be balanced with the 
legislative, political and social realities within which they operate. 
 
